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Here the concept of the human being as a “relatively isolated system” developed in 
Ingarden’s later phenomenology is adapted into an “aesthetics of isolation” that comple-
ments conventional environmental aesthetics. Such an aesthetics of isolation is especially 
relevant, given the growing “aesthetic overload” brought about by ubiquitous computing 
and new forms of art and aesthetic experience such as those involving virtual reality, 










Our world is filled with billions of desktop and laptop computers, smart-
phones, tablets, and other networked devices that serve not only as tools for 
workplace productivity, entertainment, and social interaction but also as 
portals to the world of art and aesthetic experience. Such technologies offer 
new ways of accessing previously existing forms of art like classical music, 
literature, film, and paintings; they also facilitate the development of entirely 
new forms of art, such as interactive art utilizing augmented or virtual reali-
ty, performance art involving the livestreaming of events captured with          
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wearable cameras, and collaborative performances involving participants 
from around the world. Thanks to such technologies, a growing sphere of 
new and historical human artistic creativity awaits at our fingertips wher-
ever we go. Moreover, ongoing developments in artificial intelligence and 
robotics mean that the ubiquitous computers that fill our lives do not simply 
convey artistic products created by human artists; increasingly, such tech-
nologies are capable of creating art themselves. 
Within this context, Docherty has highlighted the growing phenomenon 
of “aesthetic overload”: in today’s world, works of art and opportunities for 
aesthetic experience surround us everywhere—and yet the effect of this 
artistic deluge is to impair rather than enhance our ability to enjoy meaning-
ful aesthetic experiences (Docherty 2006, 68). The philosophical implica-
tions of this aesthetic overload become more complex when we consider 
the fact that one of the more prevalent and innovative approaches to con-
temporary aesthetics—that found in the diverse field of environmental aes-
thetics—essentially urges us to become more open to our environment and 
not more closed to it. Seemingly contrasting perspectives are thus offered on 
the question of whether contemporary human beings should seek to become 
“more open” or “more selective” in their embrace of aesthetic experience. 
In confronting such a reality, it is especially appropriate and useful to ask 
what insights phenomenology might be able to offer: as a philosophical ap-
proach, phenomenology is particularly sensitive to the contents of human 
sensory, emotional, and intellectual experience, to the nuances of the way in 
which the world manifests itself to us, and to questions of presence and ab-
sence. From a phenomenological perspective, how do we understand the 
aesthetic overload of the modern world and its relationship to contemporary 
environmental aesthetics—and what sort of response might we formulate? 
This text attempts to answer such questions by further exploring a line of 
thought developed by Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden shortly 
before his death in 1970: namely, his concept of the human being as a “rela-
tively isolated system” whose involvement with the world is characterized 
by a complex and selective interplay of openness and closure, of engagement 
and detachment. Ingarden’s concept has enjoyed considerable influence 
within the fields of systems theory and cybernetics;1 however, within the 
field of contemporary philosophical aesthetics, his notion of the human 
being as a relatively isolated system is not often discussed. In part, this may 
be due to the fact that his final (and arguably most substantive) exploration 
                                                 
1 Ingarden’s later thought on relatively isolated systems is considered innovative 
and influential enough that he has been counted among the more significant figures 
in the history of Polish cybernetics. See Sienkiewicz, Wojtala 1991, 197–199. 
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of the concept was presented as part of an investigation into the ontological 
foundations of human responsibility and not in the context of aesthetics. It is 
not known to what extent, if any, Ingarden might have developed a new phe-
nomenological aesthetics grounded explicitly in his mature concept of the 
relatively isolated system, had he lived longer. 
Here we investigate what such an aesthetics might look like and how it 
relates to our world’s growing aesthetic overload. First, we present an over-
view of Ingarden’s concept of the human being as a relatively isolated sys-
tem. Second, we show how that concept can be applied to create an aesthet-
ics of artistic creativity, aesthetic experience, and involvement in the world 
that is explicitly grounded in a phenomenology of isolation. Third, we com-
pare and contrast this phenomenological “aesthetics of isolation” with the 
contemporary approach to aesthetic experience and engagement with the 
world offered by environmental aesthetics. We suggest that by highlighting 
the value of our (partial) isolation from the world, an aesthetics of isolation 
complements traditional environmental aesthetics and its emphasis on hu-
man openness to and oneness with the environment. Indeed, an Ingardenian 
aesthetics of isolation might be understood as a unique type of environmen-
tal aesthetics that can make an especially valuable contribution to the culti-
vation of meaningful aesthetic experience in an era of ubiquitous artwork. 
 
1. Ingarden’s Concept of the Human Being  
as a Relatively Isolated System 
 
The line of thought that would eventually culminate in Ingarden’s mature 
concept of the human being as a “relatively isolated system” can be found in 
works as early as O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego, published in 1937, in 
which Ingarden develops a notion of the biological organism as a hierar-
chical structural-functional system and then uses that concept to investigate 
suggestions (made by Dilthey and others) that literary works bear similari-
ties to biological organisms (see Ingarden 1957, 47–49). Ingarden further 
elaborated such thought over the next thirty years. His final vision of the 
human being as a “relatively isolated system” would be presented in his text 
Über die Verantwortung: Ihre ontischen Fundamente, written shortly before 
his death in 1970 as an exploration of the ontological basis of human free-
dom and responsibility.2 
                                                 
2 In 1968, Ingarden presented a paper on “Ästhetik und Kunstphilosophie” at the XIV 
International Philosophical Congress in Vienna; he later expanded that text into the 
book Über die Verantwortung: Ihre ontischen Fundamente, published in 1970, which 
14  M a t t h e w  E.  G l a d d e n 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.1. The Human Unity of Body, Soul, and «I» 
 
In Ingarden’s mature model, a human being consists of three parts: (1)    
a physical body, which is identified with a person’s “biological organism” and 
whose function is to maintain the continued life of the individual and propa-
gation of the species; (2) a soul that is the site of unconscious (or precon-
scious) sensory experiences, emotional states, and personality; and (3) an 
«I» that possesses a stream of conscious awareness and is capable of many 
forms of intentionality, including acts of thought and volition. The «I» serves 
as the “organizing center” of the soul that “personifies” it and “speaks” in its 
name (Ingarden 1987, 128, 143–46). 
All living organisms possess a body, and many of the more complex types 
of animals appear to possess a soul; however human beings are the only 
entities known to possess an intentional «I». Ingarden explicitly excludes 
any Cartesian dualism from his model: for him, neither the soul nor «I» is   
a heterogenous entity bolted onto a material body; rather the «I»’s stream of 
consciousness finds its “ontic foundation” in both the body and the soul 
(Ingarden 1987, 123, 143). At the same time, neither the soul nor the «I» can 
be reduced to the physical structures or dynamics of the body. While the 
exact manner in which the soul and the «I» emerge from the physical bio-
logical organism is left unclear, Ingarden’s thought appears broadly compat-
ible with the emergentism described in Bertalanffy’s General System Theory 
and more recent frameworks like DeLanda’s assemblage theory.3 
 
1.2. Partial Isolation from the Environment and from One’s Self 
 
There are two key ways in which such a tripartite human being is “partially 
isolated.” First, the body includes mechanisms that partially isolate the hu-
man being from the causal influence of its external environment. Second, 
there are internal mechanisms that partially isolate the three parts of the 
human being from one another (Ingarden 1987, 131–134). One might think 
of these isolating mechanisms (or “isolators”) as membranes separating one 
element or subsystem from another. The fundamental property of such iso-
                                                                                                               
was translated into Polish as “O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych” (“On 
responsibility and its ontic foundations”), within a collection of his texts on human na-
ture, Książeczka o człowieku. See Ingarden 1987, 169. 
3 See von Bertalanffy 1969 and DeLanda 2011, with its investigation of the critical role 
of gradients and selective “membranes” of various types in the emergence of life, animal 
intelligence, and human memory, language, and culture. 
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lators is that they are s e l e c t i v e: they allow certain types of causal influ-
ence to pass through them while blocking others. This selectivity has a two-
fold value: on the one hand, it allows the entity enclosed by such a mem-
brane to successfully receive and assimilate those things existing beyond its 
boundary (like nutrients, energy, or information) that are necessary for its 
proper functioning; on the other hand, the entity’s inner workings are pro-
tected from undesirable external influences and can thus operate in a man-
ner free from distraction or interference (Ingarden 1987, 131–132, 138).   
It is such isolators that make possible whatever freedom we experience 
within our conscious intentional «I». 
 
1.3. The Human Body as an Isolator 
 
In any given moment, for example, the cells of the human body are being 
causally impacted by countless forces and objects arriving from the outside 
world—from cosmic rays, radio waves, magnetic fields, ultraviolet light, and 
sound waves to all of the airborne molecules that press against our skin and 
enter our lungs. The body itself constitutes a physical record of such effects 
and of the myriad biological processes occurring within its cells at a particu-
lar moment. And yet, our being is constructed in such a way that our mind is 
oblivious to the overwhelming majority of such subatomic- or molecular-
level events occurring within the body. In a sense, the body “possesses” such 
information about itself and the outside world, but it is inaccessible to the 
soul and the «I»; the body’s sensory systems screen out most of those causal 
influences, partially isolating the mind from its own body and from the out-
side world (Ingarden 1987, 136–139). 
 
1.4. The Isolation of the «I» from Body and Soul 
 
Similarly, the soul can be said to (unconsciously) “experience” all the sense 
impressions that it receives from the body, along with its own moods and 
emotional states. The soul experiences the ambient sounds that we hear in 
the environment around us; it feels the temperature and unique scent of the 
air and “knows” the current position of our limbs and our degree of hunger; 
it is the soul that continually experiences the joy or frustration that charac-
terizes our emotional state. In principle, this information is accessible to the 
conscious awareness of the «I», and if the «I» makes an intentional effort to 
ask, “What is my body feeling in this moment? What sort of mood am I in?”, 
suddenly this information begins to become present to its conscious aware-
ness (Ingarden 1987, 144–146). But normally the «I» is oblivious to most of 
the soul’s fleeting sense impressions and emotions; such information is 
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screened out so that the «I» can focus its attention on its desired matters and 
make decisions without being overwhelmed and distracted by a sea of irrel-
evant data (Ingarden 1987, 138–140). 
 
1.5. Examples of Particular Isolating Mechanisms  
within the Human Being 
 
Ingarden identifies numerous isolating mechanisms at work within the hu-
man being. For example, our memory partially isolates the present «I» from 
the world of its past; only some of our sensory experiences and conscious 
mental activities become consolidated into long-term memories, and when 
recalled, those memories are never as vivid or detailed as our current con-
scious experience (Ingarden 1987, 141–142). We also spend part of each 
day in a sleeping state in which the body is still being affected by causal in-
fluences from the outside world but the intentional «I» is blocked from re-
ceiving sense impressions that convey information about those influences 
(Ingarden 1987, 140–141). The fact that it takes a brief but measurable 
amount of time for sense data to traverse our nervous system and reach our 
brain also means that we never truly experience the world as it “now” exists; 
we are always experiencing the world as it existed a moment ago. Our cor-
poreality thus temporally isolates us from our external environment. For 
Ingarden, this extends the “freedom” of the «I» by granting the «I» an addi-
tional moment in which it can act uninfluenced by events that have already 
happened in the world (Ingarden 1987, 146–147). 
 
2. (Re)constructing an Ingardenian “Aesthetics of Isolation” 
 
Although Ingarden did not explicitly develop such a phenomenology of isola-
tion into an “aesthetics of isolation,” it is possible to find indications of what 
such an aesthetics might look like. For example, building on Bergson’s ob-
servations, Ingarden notes that as an instrument for gathering i n f o r-
m a t i o n  from the environment, each of our sensory organs ignores the 
overwhelming majority of effects created within it by forces arriving from 
the outside world; it isolates the soul and «I» from the information that such 
influences could potentially yield. Instead, each sensory organ allows only 
a tiny, specialized s e l e c t i o n  of processes occurring in the external 
world to enter and interact with it in a functional way that results in the 
sensory organ conveying sense data inward toward the conscious core of 
the human being (Ingarden 1987, 137). 
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In the case of our eyes and ears, it is only electromagnetic radiation and 
sound waves falling within a certain narrow range of frequency and intensi-
ty that are allowed through our body’s screens to generate sense impres-
sions for the soul and the «I» (Ingarden 1987, 137–138). One might suppose 
that when our eyes are “closed” we are sensorily shut off from the world, 
and when our eyes are “open” we are experiencing the world. But the point 
emphasized by an aesthetics of isolation is that even when our eyes are 
“open,” they are still closed to the majority of the processes occurring right 
in front of us in the world and to the information that they could offer. 
 
2.1. The Artistic Product as the Vestiges of Reality  
That Are Not Blocked Out 
 
In this view, the everyday natural world of our experience—the Lebenswelt 
in which we exercise artistic creativity and enjoy aesthetic experiences—is 
not the world that positively reveals itself but rather the scant sliver that 
remains after most of reality has been blocked out and concealed from us. An 
aesthetics of isolation challenges the notion that understands paintings, 
sculptures, and architectural works as primarily “positive” constructs built 
up by adding and assembling components; it calls us to consider the way in 
which such artistic products are actually the perceptible “residue” that re-
main after most of reality has been filtered away. 
The view of artistic products as the remnants that survive after a process 
of screening or deletion is not a new one. In Madrigal XII, Michelangelo 
writes that within the rough block of stone there exists “Una viva figura, / 
Che là più crescie u’ più la pietra scema”—or, as Roscoe renders it, “The more 
the marble wastes / The more the statue grows” (Buonarroti 1900, 36; Flet-
cher Roscoe 1868, 169). Similarly, in Sonnet XV, Michelangelo suggests 
that a sculptor cannot form any concept for a sculpture that does not already 
find its realization hidden within the unhewn block, ready to be revealed by 
removing portions of the stone.4 Within the context of an aesthetics of isola-
tion, one might think of the rough stone block as the fullness of the world’s 
objective reality; the completed statue is what is left for us to experience—
the natural world of our everyday lives—after our body and soul have 
screened out most of the world’s reality, thereby “sheltering” the «I» from it. 
Just as there is an infinite variety of statues that might be derived from    
a single unhewn block of stone, there are countless “worlds” of experience 
                                                 
4 “Non ha l’ ottimo artista alcun concetto, / Ch’ un marmo solo in sè non circonscri-
va / Col suo soverchio [...]” (Buonarroti 1904, 17). 
18  M a t t h e w  E.  G l a d d e n 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
that might be derived from the single objective reality, depending on which 
of its causal influences a living being’s isolators screen out and which they 
allow to provide content for the being’s conscious awareness. 
 
2.2. The Dynamism of Partial Isolation and the Variety  
of Aesthetic Experience 
 
Ingarden suggests that human isolating mechanisms are dynamic: they can 
change over the course of our lifetime as we grow and develop; they can, to 
some extent, be altered by medical disorders, drugs, spiritual practices or 
psychological techniques, or acts of will; and they can be overpowered or 
destroyed by particularly forceful stimuli. In this way, flows of causality and 
information that were once closed may become open, or vice versa (Ingarden 
1987, 144–145). Our artistic creativity and aesthetic experiences can be 
affected by such changes to our isolating mechanisms; conversely, in prin-
ciple, artistic productivity and the purposeful cultivation of aesthetic expe-
riences might be used to “stretch” or “narrow” the windows of our isolators 
and shift their focus, thereby altering the types of sensory and emotional 
information that we receive within the conscious awareness of our «I». The 
fact that human beings’ isolators vary in strength and selectivity might partly 
account for the fact that different people can enjoy very different aesthetic 
experiences of the same artistic product. Similarly, some of the great artists 
seem to “see” and “hear” and “experience” reality differently than typical 
human beings: in some cases, that unique way of being in the world might 
result from atypical sensory, emotional, and intellectual mechanisms that 
artists possess which reveal aspects of the world from which most people 
are isolated. 
 
2.3. The Human Being as a Perpetual Architect of Partial Isolation 
 
From among all the arts, there appears to be a particular link between a hu-
man being as relatively isolated system and the artistic practice of a r c h i-
t e c t u r e. Pearson and Richards note that thinkers like Heidegger, Merleau-
-Ponty, Bachelard, Zimmerman, and others have (in different ways) identi-
fied our human ability to “dwell” within a space—rather than simply be “lo-
cated” within it—as something that distinguishes us from other types of 
living creatures.5 An aesthetics of isolation highlights the active, continuous, 
and essential role that different elements of our being play in constructing 
                                                 
5 See Pearson, Richards 1994, 2, and its appraisal of Zimmerman 1985. 
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such dwelling-places. If we think of architecture as the process by which we 
“impose a schema on space”6 or as the dynamics which “shape spaces, 
boundaries, and pathways that structure individual behaviors and social 
acts” (Fisher 2016), then from their first moments, our body, soul, and «I» 
are inherently “architectural” and “architecting”: by their very nature they 
possess and employ an array of physical, sensory, emotional, and intentional 
isolators that create boundaries whose structures first segregate “inside” 
from “outside,” “present” from “past,” and then allow the carefully regulated 
passage of information and objects between those spheres. 
 
3. The Aesthetics of Isolation as a Complement and Counterpart  
to Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics 
 
In surveying contemporary environmental aesthetics, Carlson distinguishes 
two approaches: (1) “cognitive, conceptual, or narrative positions” which 
hold that aesthetic appreciation of the environment depends on human be-
ings’ possession of some particular “knowledge and information” about na-
ture, such as that which the natural sciences offer; and (2) “non-cognitive, 
non-conceptual, or ambient approaches” which hold that human beings’ 
aesthetic appreciation of the environment can arise from other dynamics 
such as “engagement, emotion arousal, or imagination.” What both ap-
proaches share is a sense that modern aesthetics had come to focus too nar-
rowly on human beings’ interaction with artificially constructed works of art 
like paintings, sculptures, and musical compositions; in doing so, aesthetic 
thought neglected our ability to derive rich aesthetic experiences from inter-
actions with our broader environment, including with the natural world 
(Carlson 2016). 
 
3.1. The “Openness” Emphasized  
by Cognitive Environmental Aesthetics 
 
At the heart of both approaches is a sense that authentic aesthetic experi-
ence depends on an o p e n n e s s  to one’s environment. The more open 
one becomes, the more opportunities arise for meaningful aesthetic experi-
ence. In the case of cognitive approaches, such “openness” includes a basic 
physical openness of one’s sensory organs to those elements of the natural 
world that are revealing themselves, as well as an intellectual openness to 
the knowledge that science can provide regarding the complexity and rich-
                                                 
6 See Tuan 1977, 36, and its discussion in Pearson, Richards 1994, 9. 
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ness of nature; emotional openness is not particularly relevant. Foster notes 
that such approaches are often oriented toward the “factual” (Foster 1998, 
129). Such facts about one’s environment are found in accurate sensory 
perceptions and scientific knowledge; without these, one might enjoy       
a powerful emotional response to the sight of some landscape, but it will not 
rise to the level of a full aesthetic experience. From the perspective of an 
Ingardenian phenomenology of isolation, one might say that such cognitive 
approaches emphasize the value of widening (and perhaps redirecting) the 
“windows” through which the isolators of one’s body allow selected sense 
data to reach the soul, the soul allows sense impressions to reach the «I», 
and the «I» allows sense impressions (and scientific knowledge) to enter its 
conscious awareness. 
 
3.2. The “Openness” Emphasized  
by Non-cognitive Environmental Aesthetics 
 
In the case of non-cognitive environmental aesthetics, the positively valued 
form of “openness” to one’s environment is less dependent on one’s eager-
ness to receive certain semantic content and more dependent on a willing-
ness to experience, ponder, and appreciate those emotions spurred by one’s 
immersion in the environment. Foster suggests that the non-cognitive ap-
proach calls us to “open ourselves to the immensity of what has been, most 
of the time and for most of us, elsewhere” (Foster 1998, 133), while Carlson 
and Berleant suggest that it involves an “open, engaging, and creative mode 
of appreciation” (Carlson, Berleant 2004, 17). Similarly, Berleant emphasizes 
the need for openness that involves overcoming “restricted attention” and 
“the tunnel vision of ordinary life”—in other words, overcoming the action 
of a human being’s internal isolators (Berleant 1999, 15). From the perspec-
tive of a phenomenology of isolation, such approaches emphasize the im-
portance of expanding (and perhaps shifting) the openings through which 
the body’s isolators allow certain sense data to reach the soul, the soul al-
lows sense impressions and emotions to reach the «I», and the «I» allows 
sense impressions and emotions to enter its conscious awareness. 
 
3.3. Berleant and Ingarden: Two Complementary Understandings  
of the Aesthetic Role of Isolation 
 
We are now in a position to compare and contrast contemporary environ-
mental aesthetics (represented here by Berleant) with an Ingardenian aes-
thetics of isolation and to identify ways in which they meaningfully challenge 
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and complement one another. Berleant refers explicitly to “isolation” in con-
nection with aesthetic experience: such isolation is a negative that can be 
overcome by cultivating a greater (emotional) openness to and oneness with 
the environment. Thus in a discussion of the aesthetic appreciation of gar-
dens, Berleant notes “a separation, both physical and psychological,” that 
“lies between the observer and what is observed.” For Berleant, such separa-
tion reflects a detrimental “Cartesian dualism of mind and body, of subject 
and object, a separation whose influence is still powerful.” Such a dualistic 
view—which accepts various kinds of separation and distancing as some-
thing necessary or even beneficial—impacts not only our ability to aestheti-
cally appreciate nature but also our relationships with one another: “The 
social consequences of this ideal are likely to be displacement, isolation, 
alienation, competition, and conflict” (Berleant 2005, 34). 
For Berleant, the concept of “isolation” is also integral to a flawed and 
outdated Kantian aesthetics that “identifies the art object as separate and 
distinct from whatever surrounds it, isolated from the rest of life” (Berleant 
2005, 4). With the Kantian aesthetic attitude of disinterestedness, “Division, 
distance, separation, and isolation are equally the order of the art and the 
order of the experience […]” (Berleant 2005, 5). Berleant suggests that ra-
ther than fostering such “division and alienation,” art and aesthetic experi-
ence may be used to bring about “reconciliation and harmony” (Berleant 
2005, 32). Indeed, Berleant positions isolation as the opposite of both art 
and love; he writes that “[…] both art and love evoke a sense of shared living, 
a certain continuity and oneness, an intimacy in which divisions disappear. 
Love, indeed, is a binding force that melts boundaries” (Berleant 2005, 157). 
An Ingardenian aesthetics of isolation, on the other hand, does not simply 
reject the notion that partial isolation is something “negative”; it argues that 
partial isolation is something that every human being must possess in order 
to have the very possibility of enjoying artistic creativity, aesthetic experi-
ence, and all forms of free and responsible involvement in the world. It is 
true that in order to be involved with the world, human beings need a cer-
tain “openness” that allows us to understand and manipulate our environ-
ment (Ingarden 1987, 123–124). But were it not for the isolators that par-
tially shield us from the world, there would be no portion of the soul or the 
«I» that is “its own”; we would be swept deterministically to and fro by all 
the causal influences pouring in from the outside world, and there would be 
no space in which we could sense, feel, think, decide, or act freely (Ingarden 
1987, 127). It is only by blocking out most of the world’s realities that our 
being is able to create such sheltered “inner” spaces within which, for exam-
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ple, an artist can develop his or her vision for a new painting or the reader of 
a novel can patiently nurture his or her own unique interpretation of the 
work and relish his or her emotional response. 
 
3.4. The Aesthetics of Isolation as Environmental Aesthetics? 
 
There is a sense in which an aesthetics of isolation might even be said to be 
“more environmental” than typical environmental aesthetics. Namely, both 
cognitive and non-cognitive approaches to environmental aesthetics view 
the modern human being as increasingly distanced and disconnected from 
the natural world, insofar as they focus on the contemporary challenge of 
creating meaningful aesthetic experience for the emotional soul (in the case 
of non-cognitive approaches) or the intentional «I» (in the case of cognitive 
approaches). However, Ingarden reminds us that our physical biological 
organism—our body—is already and always engaged in a rich, complex 
array of countless forms of causal interaction and engagement with the en-
tire natural world (Ingarden 1987, 137). Most of the information about the 
world and its aesthetic qualities that the body receives will never be mani-
fested to the soul or the «I»; it will remain forever hidden within the body. 
But it nevertheless raises the possibility of aesthetic “experiences” that in-
volve neither sensation, emotion, or intentionality and yet are, in some 
sense, both “ours” and quite “real.” 
 
3.5. The Importance of Partial Isolation  
in an Age of “Aesthetic Overload” 
 
One might argue that a well-developed aesthetics of isolation becomes in-
creasingly valuable today as a counterbalance to conventional environmen-
tal aesthetics, amidst what Docherty (in a discussion of Benjamin and 
Vattimo) refers to as the “information/aesthetic overload” of the Infor-
mation Age and its negative impact on our ability to aesthetically appreciate 
anything (Docherty 2006, 68). The rise of the Internet, mobile computing, 
streaming video, social media, virtual reality, and related technologies 
means that our environment is now teeming with countless devices that 
offer us endless access to downloadable literary works, films, and music; 
virtual museums; live-streamed performance art; collaborative online con-
certs; and new forms of interactive fiction and shared virtual worlds. Such 
devices are not simply tools for mass entertainment; they are transmitters 
and agents of both “popular” and “high” culture. Moreover, autonomously 
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functioning software is increasingly capable of creating music, paintings, 
poetry, literature, fashion designs, and other works of art with a degree of 
ingenuity, emotional and cultural sensitivity, “imaginativeness,” and tech-
nical skill that approaches that of human artists.7 This means that the 15+ 
billion smartphones, tablets, and other networked devices that fill our world 
(Nordrum 2016) are not only capable of transmitting works of art created by 
human artists; the artificial agents embodied in many such devices are also 
capable of becoming the creators of original works of art—of becoming art-
ists—themselves. Increasingly, even a modest smartphone has the potential 
to craft an endless stream of novel, unique, personalized, and deeply mean-
ingful works of art. 
In such a world, the overflowing sea of art becomes inescapable. It is no 
longer a challenge to f i n d  artistic objects or opportunities for aesthetic 
experience; they find us through the glowing screens that lurk in every cor-
ner of our lives. The greater challenge is to  i s o l a t e  ourselves from most 
of them, so that each day we might be able to enjoy, say, one true and mean-
ingful aesthetic experience rather than a thousand fragmentary “semi-
experiences.” An aesthetics of isolation points toward a new type of envi-




From a phenomenological perspective, contemporary environmental aes-
thetics emphasizes the manifold ways in which the world reveals itself to us. 
An Ingardenian aesthetics of isolation suggests that perhaps a more philo-
sophically interesting dynamic is not the way in which very narrow shards 
of the world manifest themselves to us and make themselves p r e s e n t  
but the way in which the overwhelming majority of reality is actively made 
a b s e n t—and the essential role that such partial isolation plays in enabling 
human artistic creativity and aesthetic experience. If conventional environ-
mental aesthetics asks how we can enjoy experiences of greater oneness 
with the natural world, the aesthetics of isolation asks why it is that we are 
not a l r e a d y  one with such reality to start with; it seeks to understand 
those mechanisms of our body, soul, and «I» that prevent us from enjoying 
a single overwhelming aesthetic experience that encompasses the whole of 
time and space and all of the unglimpsed aesthetic qualities embedded with-
in the universe. Each approach elicits a different set of insights, and if used as 
                                                 
7 For ongoing developments in the fields of artificial creativity and robotic art, see, 
e.g., McCormack, d’Inverno 2012; Besold et al. 2014; Herath et al. 2016. 
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complementary tools they enrich our ability to understand those forms of 
artistic creativity and aesthetic experience that exist today, as well as those 
that may emerge in the future. In an era in which new forms of art and aes-
thetic experience reach out to us continually—aided by the proliferation of 
powerful and ubiquitous new technologies—the ability to both open a n d 
close ourselves to our environment’s countless forms of self-manifestation 
can be expected to become an ever more important element of the search for 
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